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TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: AN ANALYSIS OF
MONTA V. UNITED STATES
S.J. Bloxham
In Montana v. United States, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (1981), the Su-
preme Court has taken another major step in its evolving quest to
restructure the doctrine of tribal sovereignty. At the same time, it
apparently has disregarded a body of law more than four centu-
ries old, which delineates the existing proprietary rights of tribes
to their aboriginal lands, and which at the same time is the his-
torical basis of federal claims to land ownership in the United
States.
By tribal resolution, the Crow Tribe of Montana prohibited
hunting and fishing within their reservation by nonmembers of
the tribe. The state of Montana, however, also asserted the auth-
ority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians within the
reservation. Proceeding in its own right and as fiduciary for the
tribe, the United States filed suit against the state seeking a
declaration that the tribe and the United States have sole authori-
ty to regulate on-reservation hunting and fishing. In-addition to
the tribe's inherent sovereignty and a claim of federal preemp-
tion, the federal government relied upon its purported ownership
in trust for the tribe of the bed of the Big Horn River to justify
tribal jurisdiction.
Rejecting these claims, the Supreme Court held that neither the
1851 nor the 1868 Fort Laramie treaties with the Crow Tribe had
conveyed beneficial ownership of the riverbed to the tribe. Invok-
ing the "strong presumption" against the conveyance by the Uni-
ted States of the beds of navigable rivers that it holds in trust for
future states, the Court declared that the state of Montana holds
title to the bed of the Big Horn River. Further, the Court said,
the state has regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on lands
within the reservation owned by non-Indians, and the Crow Tribe
may regulate such nonmembers only where they "enter con-
sensual relationships with the tribe or its members," or when
nonmembers' conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe."'
In the Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851,2 the United States and
various signatory tribes, including the Crow Tribe, acknowledged
© 1981 S.J. Bloxham
1. 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1257 (1981).
2. 11 Stat. 749 (1851).
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designated lands as the territories of the respective tribes. The
treaty identified approximately 38.5 million acres as the territory
of the Crows. In the treaty with the Crows at Fort Laramie in
1868, 3 the Crow Tribe ceded to the United States all but 8 million
acres of their territory, which both parties to the treaty agreed
were to be set apart for the "absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation" of the Crow Tribe. Subsequent cession agreements
and an act of Congress reduced the reservation to slightly less
than 2.3 million acres.' As a result of the allotment program, ap-
proximately 28 percent of the reservation is held in fee by non-
Indians.
It is difficult to see how any question could arise about wheth-
er the United States had conveyed to the tribe lands which the
tribe had withheld from its cession to the United States. After all,
who was ceding its territory to whom? The Court consciously avoids
the issue by characterizing the 1868 Treaty as having "reduced"
the size of Crow territory, without ever indicating that the United
States acquired rights at the same time.6 Instead, we are told that
the "ownership of land under navigable waters is an incident of
sovereignty."' The United States owning the land in the first in-
3. 15 Stat. 649 (1868).
4. Act of Apr. 11, 1882, ch. 74, 22 Stat. 42; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 31, 26
Stat. 989; Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1624, 33 Stat. 352; Act of Aug. 31, 1937, ch. 890, 50
Stat. 884. The Acts of 1882, 1891, and 1904 ratify agreements between the Crow Tribe
and the United States; the Act of 1937 appears to be unilateral.
5. 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1251 (1981).
6. Id. Admittedly, the 1868 Treaty does not expressly declare that land is being ced-
ed. In article 2 of the Treaty, "The United States agrees that" designated lands be "set
apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the Crow Tribe. The tribe
agrees to "relinquish all title, claims, or rights in and to any portion of the territory of the
United States, except" within the designated reservation. Nevertheless it is clear that all
territory within the present Crow Reservation is territory that was withheld from cession
to the United States. Article eleven of the 1868 Treaty provides that "No treaty for the
cession of any portion of the reservation herein described . . . shall be of any force or
validity as against the said Indians" unless signed by at least a majority of adult males of
the tribe. In the agreement ratified by the Act of 1882, supra note 4, the Crow Tribe
agrees to "dispose of and sell to the Government of the United States" a portion of the
reservation. This is referred to later in the agreement as "the session [sic] of territory to
be made by us." In the agreement ratified by the Act of 1891, supra note 4, the tribe
again agrees to "dispose of and sell to the Government" designated lands. This also is
later termed a "cession of territory" by the tribe. Finally, in the agreement ratified by the
Act of 1904, supra note 4, the tribe agrees to "cede, grant, and relinquish to the United
States" another portion of Crow territory. The Court in Montana describes these as
"subsequent Acts of Congress [which] reduced the reservation. " Id. at 1250 (emphasis
supplied).
7. Id. at 1251, citing Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 409-11 (1842).
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stance, the question was whether it had conveyed the land to the
tribe, or instead had retained the land in trust to pass to the state
of Montana upon its admission to the Union, under the "equal
footing" doctrine.
Although the Court fails to tell us, the United States in fact did
assert a claim to Crow territory prior to its cession and continues
to assert that claim to the unceded portion. Based upon the
discovery doctrine, the United States claimed an entitlement to
Crow territory through the cession of that entitlement to the
United States by France in 1803.8 This entitlement through "dis-
covery" was variously termed a right of preemption, or more
commonly, the fee simple subject to Indian right of occupancy,
or the "naked fee." 9 This fee title was a legal fiction used to
reconcile the granting of patents by the holder of the preemption
right to lands still subject to the recognized rights of tribes to
sovereign possession. The fee was "naked" because it was devoid
of any right to possession, which was in the Indian tribes. A fee
simple absolute did not result until the Indian right to possession
was united with the naked fee."0 As recently as 1941, in United
States v. Santa Fe Pacific Ry. ," the Supreme Court unanimously
denied that any right to possession attaches to a grant in fee sim-
ple by the United States of lands that are subject to the tribal
aboriginal right to possession. Even if the United States had con-
veyed the fee to Crow lands to Montana upon its admission in
1889, therefore, this does not mean that any right to possession
was conveyed. If the state owns the fee to the bed of the Big
Horn River, that fee is still only an entitlement to the river,
without possessory rights until the United States might obtain
them from the Crow Tribe.
The Court places great emphasis on its opinion in United
States v. Holt State Bank," which it reads as having "reject[ed]
an Indian tribe's claim of title to the bed of a navigable lake,"
which lay "wholly within the boundaries of the Red Lake Indian
reservation, which had been created by treaties entered into be-
fore Minnesota joined the Union."' 3 According to the Court,
"[t]he Crow treaties in this case, like the Chippewa treaties in
8. The Louisiana Cession, Treaty of Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200.
9. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 543-45 (1832). See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD 31-49 (1980).
10. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 526 (1877).
11. 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
12. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
13. 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1251 (1981).
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Holt State Bank, fail to overcome the established presumption
that the beds of navigable waters remain in trust for future States
and pass to the new States when they assume sovereignty.'
' 4
What the Court fails to tell us is that the land in question in Holt
State Bank had been ceded by the Chippewas to the United States
more than thirty-five years before the case was decided. In fact,
no tribal claim was even at issue in the case. Instead, the United
States claimed that it held the land under the terms of the cession
agreement, where it had promised to dispose of the ceded lands at
a stated price and deposit the proceeds in a trust account for the
tribe.'" Holt State Bank held that the terms of a cession agree-
ment cannot affect the prior rights of the holder of the preemp-
tion right in the ceded lands. Conveyance of the fee by the United
States prior to the cession conveyed the entitlement to have com-
plete title after the tribe's rights were relinquished. After cession
by the tribe, the right to possession immediately attached to the
fee. Furthermore, the Holt State Bank decision does not support
the Court's holding in Montana that the terms of the Crow treaty
did not overcome a presumption against conveyance by the Uni-
ted States of its title to the tribe. The Court in Holt State Bank
expressly relied upon the fact that there "was no formal setting
apart of what was not ceded" in the Chippewa treaty at issue,
taking care to distinguish it from another treaty reserving the
lands of other Chippewa bands.' 6 Significantly, the Crow treaty
in Montana v. United States expressly declared that the unceded
Crow lands were set apart for their "undisturbed use and occupa-
tion."
7
The other case chiefly relied upon, Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma," is totally inapposite to the situation in Montana. In
Choctaw Nation, the Supreme Court upheld the-tribe's claim of
rights under its treaty with the United States. In the Choctaw
treaty, the federal government ceded lands outside the tribe's
aboriginal domain to the tribe in return for the cession of the
tribe's entire aboriginal territory to the United States. Never-
theless, in his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens reads Choctaw
Nation for the proposition that "the strong presumption against
dispositions by the United States of land under navigable waters
14. Id. at 1251.
15. 270 U.S. 49, 52 (1926).
16. Id. at 58 & n.1.
17. 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1251 (1981).




in the territories . . . applie[s] to Indian reservations.' 9 Of
course, the presumption only applies to grants; while the Choc-
taw Reservation in Oklahoma was created by a grant from the
United States, the Crow Reservation was "created" by the Crow
Tribe having withheld lands from sale to the United States.
But why should the mere non-Indian ownership of lands with-
in the Crow Reservation give the state sovereign authority over
those lands? State sovereignty is not dependent upon ownership
of land within its jurisdiction, nor can a state be sovereign out-
side its territorial bounds.20 The answer is that the Court con-
siders both the state and the tribe to be sovereign within the
bounds of the Crow Reservation. Identity of parties and owner-
ship of lands involved are factors the Court balances in determin-
ing whether the state, the tribe, or both has subject matter
jurisdiction in a particular case.
Although it was held as early as 1881 that an incoming state
obtains criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations
within the state's external boundaries, 2' the absence of tribal
criminal and civil jurisdiction is of recent origin. It is significant
that the Court in Montana is only able to cite a single case that
denied the right of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians
within tribal territory-the Court's recent decision in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe.22 In Montana, as it did in Oliphant, the
Court places great reliance on Justice Johnson's words in his
"concurrence" in Fletcher v. Peck,2" "the first Indian case to
reach this Court-that the Indian tribes have lost 'any right of
governing every person within their limits except themselves.' ",24
Of course, Justice Johnson actually was dissenting in his opinion
in Fletcher.25 More importantly, the Court in Montana misquotes
Johnson's remarks, and both Montana and Oliphant attribute to
Johnson's words an improbable meaning. According to Justice
Johnson, "All of the restrictions upon the right of soil in the In-
dians, amount only to an exclusion of all competitors from their
markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty amounts to the
right of governing every person within their limits except them-
19. 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1265 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
20. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
21. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
22. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). See Barsh & Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Su-
quamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REv. 609 (1979).
23. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810) (opinion of Johnson, J.).
24. 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1257 (1981).
25. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 145-47 (1810).
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selves." 26 This is not to say that "the limitation upon their
sovereignty amounts to the loss of the right of governing," as the
Court would have us read it. Clearly, it is the existence of, rather
than the loss of, the right to govern within tribal territory which
limits tribal sovereignty. But a "right" can be a "limitation" on-
ly if it limits some other right. Under Johnson's view, the federal
government has gained the right to govern non-Indians within tri-
bal territory; the limitation on tribes is the resulting loss of the ex-
clusiveness of their right to govern. Johnson claimed only that
the tribes must share concurrent jurisdiction.
In Oliphant we are told that "the tribes' retained powers are
not such that they are limited only by specific restrictions in
treaties or congressional enactments." 2 Rather, "Indian tribes
are prohibited from exercising both those powers ... that are ex-
pressly terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent
with their status.' "2 In Montana we find that the powers lost
because of the tribes' "status" are considerable: "exercise of
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with
the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without
express Congressional delegation." 29 For such a sweeping state-
ment, the Court refers us to four cases, only one of which even
involved tribal rights: Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones." In that
case, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the state of New
Mexico to assess sales taxes on the operation of the tribe's ski
resort, which was located off the reservation, outside of tribal
territory. The only question was whether either the terms of the
Indian Reorganization Act3' or the federal instrumentality doc-
trine prohibited taxation of the tribal enterprise. No question of
either tribal or state authority on the reservation arose.
The Court's heavy reliance upon Williams v. Lee32 is also
misplaced. Williams, of course, was a conflict of laws case, with
only state judicial competence at issue. In that case, the Supreme
Court denied the state courts competence over causes arising on
the reservation, even though they may have jurisdiction over the
parties, if exercise of such authority "infringes" upon tribal self-
26. Id. at 147.
27. 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
28. Id. (emphasis in original).
29. 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1257-58 (1981).
30. 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
31. 25 U.S.C. § 465.




government. If the reservation were simply a foreign nation or
another state, on the other hand, state court competence would
have existed. How can such a rule support the denial of tribal
authority within the tribe's boundaries? It does not, of course; in-
stead, the "governmental interest" approach in Williams is used
to justify a similar balancing of interests in determining the sub-
ject matter competence of both state and tribal legislative bodies.
As a final contortion of legal logic, the Court finds that "[a]ny
argument" that tribal regulation of hunting and fishing "is
necessary to Crow tribal self-government is refuted by" a finding
that "the parties to this case had accommodated themselves" to
the state's exercise of " 'near exclusive' jurisdiction over hunting
and fishing on fee lands within the reservation." '3 3 If merely
becoming "accommodated" to the illegitimate exercises of
governmental authority were to render that authority legitimate,
of what use is the Constitution? Such a principle would mean that
the entire line of Supreme Court decisions imposing the limita-
tions of the Bill of Rights on the states through fourteenth
amendment incorporation was mistaken, 34 and that Brown v.
Board of Education,3 where the Court struck down state-
imposed "separate but equal" schooling, was wrongly decided. Is
the Court ready to overrule these cases?
The Court in Montana claims to base its decision upon prin-
ciples, and it therefore admits the necessity of a principled ap-
proach. However, cjose analysis of its opinion in Montana reveals
that the Court prefers to base its decision upon ad hoc principles
and extraneous language taken out of context from prior deci-
sions. It is apparent from the Court's use of legal authority that it
has disregarded a fundamental principle of the legal method: that
the language of a court opinion must be interpreted in light of its
holding. The propensity of the Court to base its decision on the
selective use of dictum, rather than principled analysis of actual
holdings, undermines the integrity of both the Court and the en-
tire judicial process. Such behavior by the Court diminishes the
rights of all of us.
33. 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1264-66 (1981).
34. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
35. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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